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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COURT OF
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
WERNER FELD*
Few topics have been discussed more in the United States
and Canada during recent months than the European Common
Market. The mounting concern with the problems of the
Common Market reveals a great variety of attitudes rang-
ing from enthusiastic support to strong fears and plain con-
fusion; this concern is also a most convincing evidence of the
impact of the Common Market on world affairs.
John W. Holmes, the president of the Canadian Institute
of International Affairs, wrote in the spring of 1962, that
while undoubtedly the Common Market was making a signifi-
cant contribution to the theory and practice of international
collaboration, "there is some reason for misgivings, however,
as to whether the result will be supre-nationalism or super-
nationalism.' '1 He also observed that it was strange how
few Americans had recognized "the deep-seated anti-Ameri-
can aspects of the European movement, the urge to be inde-
pendent of American aid and policy, the bitterness at Ameri-
can anti-colonialism, and the anti-Coca Cola mystique. 12 In
a speech in New Brunswick, Canada, in August of this year,
J. Robert Schaetzel, U. S. Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Atlantic Affairs, attempted to supply the answer to the ques-
tion as to why the United States supported the Common
Market. He stated that this support rested "on the solid
basis of what we conceive to be enlightened American self-
interest.'1 Mr. Schaetzel acknowledged, however, that the
American attitude toward the Common Market, "while basic-
ally one of hopeful anticipation," was not "without a shadow
of apprehension." He recognized the problem of a rather
protracted transition period, but hoped to see develop out of
the process of unifying Europe a new relationship across the
Atlantic. He concluded his speech by stating:
LL.B., University of Berlin; Ph.D., Tulane University; Assistant Pro-
fessor of Political Science, Moorhead State College.
1. Holmes, The Political Implications of the European Economic Com-
munity, Queens Quarterly, p. 4 (Spring 1962).
2. Ibid.
3. Schaetzel, The United States and the Common Market, Dep't State
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The important thing is that an idea of unity has
gained ascendency where disunity existed before.
The idea has caught on at the moment when history
needed it. If we Atlantic nations can continue on our
present course, we can create a position of such over-
whelming but constructive strength that peace can be
achieved either by deterrence or by negotiation with
the East.4
It is difficult to determine at this time how much of the
pessimism of Mr. Holmes or of the optimism of Mr. Schaetzel
will be borne out by future events. There is little question,
however, that the economics of the United States and Canada,
particularly as far as the agricultural segments in the North
Central Plains are concerned, must face up to certain trade
dislocations as the goals and objectives of the Common
Market are being implemented. Futhermore, additional
strains may be imposed on these economies when Great
Britain and other West European countries such as Denmark
and Norway obtain full membership in the Common Market
within the next few years. 5
There is also little question that in the shaping of future
West European Community developments, regardless whether
they are economic or political in nature and regardless
whether they pertain to the internal or external relations of
the Common Market countries, the Court of Justice of the
European Communities will play an increasingly important
role. Over the years this Court has assumed a role consid-
erably exceeding that which was envisaged by the framers
of the Treaties when they established this judicial institution.
Yet, few American lawyers are fully aware of the signific-
ance of this Court. It is therefore appropriate and especially
timely to take a look at some of the significant features of
the Court and to draw attention to the implications of certain
of its salient decisions and opinions.
I
The Court of Justice of the European Communities is one
of the two major institutions which are common to the other-
Bull. at 350-5 (Sept. 3, 1962).
4. Id. at 355.
5. For background information on this problem see Weiss, The Signifi-
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wise separate three European Communities, namely the
European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Community
for Atomic Energy (EURATOM). When the EEC, better
known as the Common Market, and EURATOM came into
being in 1958, the governments of the six states involved in
this undertaking, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
Holland, and Luxembourg, deemed it advisable to give the
three formally separate Communities a common Court and a
common Parliament, possibly as a pledge of more unity to
come. The Court as thus established, generally carried on
the task and functions of the Court of Justice of the European
Coal and Steel Community which had been in existence and
functioning since 1953. It took over most of its predecessor's
personnel, its localities, the greater part of its members, and
its docket of nearly forty cases that were pending.6
The Court of Justice consists of seven judges appointed for
a term of six years by the governments of the Member States
and eligible for reappointment at the end of their term of
office. They are assisted by two "advocates-general", also
appointed for six years by the governments of the Member
States, whose functions it is "to present publicly, with com-
plete impartiality and independence, reasoned conclusions on
cases submitted to the Court of Justice, with a view of assist-
ing the latter in the performance of its duties. . . ." The in-
stitution of the advocate-general is modeled after the Govern-
ment Commissioner of the French Conseil d'Etat, the most
important of the French administrative courts and the apex
of the French administrative court system."'
The competence of the Court is quite extensive and the
provisions granting jurisdiction to the Court are scattered
throughout the three Treaties, the Statute of the Court, and
canee of the European Common Market, Dep't State Bull. at 443-8 (Sep-
tember 24, 1962).
6. Donner, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, The
Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, at 232-43
(May 1962). Professor Donner is currently President of the Court. For de-
tails and functions of the Court see VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUS-
TICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY (1955). In
consulting this book, it must be remembered that it was written prior to
the establishment of EEC and EURATOM.
7. Articles 32 ECSC Treaty and 11-13 of the Protocol on the Code
of the Court of Justice, better known as its Statute; articles 165-7 EEC
Treaty; and articles 137-9 EURATOM Treaty.
8. For additional information see SCHWARZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, at 23-41 and 133-9 (1954).
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the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities. Basically, the
function of the Court is to ensure the rule of law in the inter-
pretation and application of the Treaties and the regulations
for their implementation. 9 Starting from this principle, the
Treaties provide that the Court shall rule on suits of Mem-
ber States against each other, on those of the various institu-
tions of the Communities against each other, and on appeals
by staff members of the institutions against decisions concern-
ing them. In addition, there are three features which make
the Court quite unprecedented. These features are the right
of appeal of private persons against the action (or inaction)
of the executive bodies of the Communities; the right of those
executive bodies to lodge a suit against Member States which
are defaulting on their Treaty obligation; and the power of
the Court to bind domestic jurisdictions in their interpreta-
tions and applications of the Treaties. 10
This list does not exhaust the jurisdiction of the Court.1"
Even so, the list immediately calls attention to the fact that
the Court is more than an international court in the strict
sense. Indeed, the functions assigned to the Court justify
its classification as an administrative and a "constitutional"
tribunal1 2 and for this reason it has been considered as appro-
priate to attribute to the Court a supra-national character.
To fully understand the significance of this wide-spread
jurisdiction, some additional elaborating comments are in
order. The executive bodies of the Communities, the High
Authority of the ECSC and the Commissions of the EEC and
EURATOM, are empowered to by-pass the governments and
administrations of the Member States and to address their
regulations and decisions directly to the national subjects. It
is therefore only fair that, in turn, these individuals should
9. Article 31 ECSC; article 164, EEC; and article 134, EURATOM.
10. Articles 33-43, 89 ECSC Treaty; 169-84 EEC Treaty, and 141-155
EURATOM Treaty.
11. Valentine analyses the competence of the Court in great detail and
classifies the various types of competence under ten categories (Supra n.
6 at 65-69).
12. A. Van Houtte ]a Cour de Justice de In CECA, European Yearbook,
Vol. II, 183-210, particularly p. 187, note 2; also M. Lagrange, The Role
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities as seen through its
Case Law, and Paul Reuter, Juridical and Institutional Aspects of the
European Regional Communities, both in 26 Law and Comtemporary Prob-
lems at 381-99 and 400-17 respectively, particularly 394, 395, 399, 403-5
(1961). Further ef. article 95 of the ECSC Treaty which requires the Court




be entitled to lodge an appeal against those acts with the
Court. According to the Treaties, private persons have a
right to demand the annulment of individual decisions and
recommendations affecting them on one of the following
grounds: lack of legal competence; major violation of proced-
ure; violation of the Treaties or any rule of law relating to
their application; or "detournement de pouvoir" which the
English text calls abuse of power.
1 3
Whenever an appeal has been lodged against a decision or
recommendation of the High Authority under article 33 of
the ECSC Treaty, the Court "may not review the High Au-
thority's evaluation of the situation, based on economic facts
and circumstances, which led to such decisions or recommen-
dations, except where the High Authority is alleged to have
abused its powers or to have clearly misinterpreted the provi-
sions of the Treaty or of a rule of law relating to its applica-
tion." In the EEC and EURATOM Treaties, these restrictive
words have been left out. 14 This does not imply, however, that
under the latter Treaties the powers of the Court are more
extensive than under the ECSC Treaty. The phraseology of
the ECSC Treaty has been dropped because it expressed in
an imperfect way something that was so obvious that it did
not have to be said. The Court exercises only a power of
legal control over the executive organs of the Communities.
As long as these organs stay within the limit of the law, it
is solely up to them to decide how they exercise their powers. 15
The Coal and Steel Treaty permits private enterprises to
appeal against inaction of the High Authority whenever this
organ is required by the Treaty to issue a decision or recom-
mendati n and fails to fulfill such an obligation. In this way
it has been possible for those, who thought the High Authority
too timid in the use of its powers, to lodge an appeal even for
inaction against their own national government. 6 The EEC
and EURATOM Treaties leave this right in full to Member
States and to other Institutions of the Communities; with re-
13. Articles 33 ECSO Treaty, 173 EEC Treaty, and 146 EURATOM Treaty.
14. See article 173, EEC Treaty, and article 146 EURATOM Treaty.
15. Donner, supra n. 6 at 236.
16. See e. g., the Court's judgment in the case of Groupement des In-
dustries Siderurgiques Luxembourgeoises v. The High Authority, Dec. Nos.
7/54 and 9/54, 2 RecuelI de Ia Jurisprudence de In Cour (hereafter referred
to as Rec.) 87 (1956).
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gard to private persons, however, they restrict it to cases in
which the executive organs have failed to address a decision
to them. As a consequence, private enterprises are no longer
allowed to file complaints in general with regard to an in-
action of these organs.
Regarding the right of the executive bodies to submit to
the Court their differences with Member States about the
scope and nature of their obligations, the Treaties are not
quite identical. The ECSC Treaty specifies that the High
Authority, if it considers that one of the Member States fails
to fulfill its obligation under the Treaty, shall take note of
such a failure in a reasoned decision, which allows the State
in question a period of time within which to execute its obli-
gation. The State concerned may appeal to the Court, which
then rules on the justification of the decision. If the appeal
is rejected or if no appeal is lodged within two months,
certain economic sanctions may be taken by the Community's
executive organs against the State violating its obligations. 17
The other two treaties provide that the Commissions of the
Common Market and EURATOM shall in like circumstances
address themselves to the Member States. If the State fails
to comply within a period laid down by the Commission, then
the latter may refer the matter to the Court of Justice. If
the Court rules against the State, its government shall take
the measures required for the implementation of the judg-
ment of the Court, but the two newer Treaties do not permit
the application of economic sanctions.1- Although this may be
considered as a backward step, it must not be overlooked
that the pressure of public opinion constitutes a most effective
sanction, since none of the Member States would wish to be
summoned before the Court by either of the Commissions to
hear their action or inaction condemned in law.
The EEC Commission has begun to use its power in a
very thorough way. Each time it discovers what it considers
to be a contravention of the Treaties by the Member States,
however unimportant, it sues those States in Court. In 1961
two actions were filed against the Italian government; one
for restricting the importation of pigs and pork products,
17. Article 88, ECSC Treaty.
18. Articles 169, 171 EEC Treaty and 141, 143 EURATOM Treaty.
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and the other for applying to imported radio parts a higher
tariff than justified by the tariff existing on Jaunary 1, 1958,
the date to be used for the calculation of the progressive tariff
reductions. In both cases the Court found that those
measures of the Italian government violated Italy's obligations
under the Treaty. 19 A third case is still pending against the
governments of Belgium and Luxembourg for levying a higher
fee on import licenses for gingerbread than was permitted by
the "stand-still" provision of the EEC Treaty.20 A fourth
case against the German Federal Republic for placing restric-
tions on the importation of beef has been dropped in April
of 1962 after the Federal government rectified the alleged
violation of the Treaty.
The purpose of the power of the Court of Justice to bind
domestic jurisdictions in their interpretations and applica-
tions of the Treaties is to prevent six different interpretations
of the Treaties by the national courts which could frustrate
the goal of a Common Market under common rules. To avoid
this consequence, the Treaties, particularly the EEC Treaty,
provide that whenever questions concerning their interpre-
tation are raised in a national court or tribunal of the last
resort, such a court or tribunal shall refer the matter to the
Court of Justice of the Communities. In such an event this
Court is to give a preliminary decision about the interpreta-
tion to be adopted and the national court has to observe this
decision in the ruling on the case before it. This joins the
Court and the national jurisdictions into a common system
for a common purpose.
A first request for a preliminary decision under the EEC
Treaty provisions of article 177 reached the Court during its
1961-62 term. The Court of Appeals at the Hague suspended
proceedings in a litigation involving the legality of an exclu-
19. EEC Commission v. The Government of the Italian Republic, Dec.
No. 7/61, December 19, 1961, 7/V Rec. 633 (1961) and EEC Commission v.
The Government of the Italian Republic, Dec. No. 10/61, February 27, 1962,
8/I Rec. 1 (1962). It is interesting to note that in the first case the Italian
government had lifted the import restrictions before the Court pronounced
its judgment. As a consequence, the Italian government contended that
since the grounds for the suit had been removed, the Court should deny
the admissibility of the suit. The Court held, however, that according to
the Treaty the object of the suit was a request for a statement of the
Court that a Member State had violated a Treaty obligation, and that it did
not have to examine whether the State involved had carried out, after
the filing of the suit, the measures necessary to rectify the violation of
the Treaty.
20. Cases 2 and 3/62.
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sive export sales contract under article 85 of the EEC Treaty
which declares as void certain clauses in restraint of trade.
It asked the Court of Justice for a ruling on the interpreta-
tion of article 85, which that Court pronounced on April 6,
1962. 21
What are the powers of the Court to enforce its judgments?
As has been pointed out earlier, in actions against the govern-
ments of the Member States only the ECSC Treaty provides
for means of enforcing the Court's decisions which consist of
the application of sanctions by the Community's executive
organs.2 2 Against defending parties other than the govern-
ments of the Member States, however, judgments of the
Court can be enforced in all six countries. A party who wants
a decision of the Court executed, can address itself directly
to the national judiciary authority which verifies the authen-
ticity of the Court's judgment; after authentication, it is ex-
ecuted in the same manner as national judgments.2 3
II
The procedure before the Court of Justice is divided into
two stages. In the first stage the procedure is conducted in
written form and usually involves the exchange of four briefs
between the contending parties as well as the submission of
documentary evidence and supporting papers or certified
copies thereof. In the second stage the procedure is oral and
includes the reading of the report presented by the report-
ing judge, as well as the hearing by the Court of witnesses,
experts, and the legal advisors of the parties. The procedure
closes with the presentation of arguments by one of the advo-
cates-general in which this official presents in all impartiality
his opinion on the points of law raised by the case and accord-
ingly proposes the ruling he thinks appropriate.2
4
21. Request for a Preliminary Decision presented by the Court of Ap-
peals of the Hague in the case of Kledingverkoopbedrijf Co. de Geus v.(1) Robert Bosch Gmbh, (2) Willem van Rijn Inc., Dec. No. 13/61, April
6, 1962, 8/I Rec. 89 (1962). The Court interpreted article 85 as not voiding
objectionable agreements ex tune with the entry in force of the EEC
Treaty. This decision may turn out to be one of the most significantjudgments rendered by the Court since it involves for the first time the
application of the important anti-trust clauses of the EEC Treaty. (Cf.
Hermann Schumacher, Die Durehfuebrung der Arikel S5 uind 85 des Rom-
Vertrages, Wirtsehaft und Wettbewerb, July/August 1962, p. 475-85.
22. Supra n. 19.
23. Articles 44, 92 ECSC Treaty, 187, 192 EEC Treaty, and 159, 164
EURATOM Treaty.
24. Cf. articles 21-28 of the Statute of the Court.
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The Court is not obliged to follow the opinions of the advo-
cate-general nor to give reasons for not doing so. As a matter
of fact, the advocate-general does not participate in the judi-
cial conference.2 5  Nevertheless, even if his opinions are not
followed, the functions of the advocate-general are important.
During the hearing of the case, he can question witnesses as
well as representatives and legal advisers of the parties.
2 6
Moreover, when one considers that the Court rules in the
first, last, and only instance on cases before it, the advocate-
general assists in clarifying the factual and legal aspects of
the case, a function which normally is performed for other
supreme jurisdictions by the lower courts. Thus the advocate-
general provides a useful challenge for the judges of the Court
with which they have to deal before pronouncing their final
decision.
The deliberations of the Court are and shall remain secret .
2
When differences of opinion occur, a vote is taken and the
opinion of the majority of judges is accepted for the judg-
ment. However, the manner of voting is not indicated in the
judgment which appears as a single uniform decision.28 Pro-
fessor Donner, the president of the Court, observed in a recent
article that the exclusion of the possibility of giving dissent-
ing opinions protects the independence of the judges. It
forces the judges to wbrk out an agreement on the wording
of the decision and thus requires longer discussion in confer-
ence, but it ensures opinions that are understandable through
out the Communities and contributes to the establishment of
a common fund of legal notions and principles. 2
A difficult problem in the procedure before the Court is
the recognition of four official languages; French, German,
Italian, and Dutch. The Rules of Procedure establish the
basic principle that the plaintiff may select the language in
which the case will be heard. However, if the defendant is
not an institution of the Communities but a Member State or
a natural or legal person of a Member State, the case is heard
25. Article 27, par. 2,-of the Rules of Procedures of the Court of Justice,
Journal Offlelel des Communautees Europeenew, January 18, 1960.
26. Article 40, par. 4, and article 57 of the Rules of Procedure.
27. Article 29 of the Statute of the Court.
28. For details see article 27 of the Rules of Procedure.
29. Donner, supra n. 6 at 234.
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in the language of the defendant.30 Since the judges have not
been chosen for the linguistic abilities, but for their knowledge
of the law, all documents brought before the Court are trans-
lated in each of the three other official languages and during
the oral procedure a simultaneous translation is provided.
Futhermore, the judgments of the Court are published in
all four languages, but only the copy in the original language
used during the procedure before the Court is considered to be
authentic.31
Although the Treaties do not provide for formal appeals
against the judgments of the Court, a reconsideration of a
judgment may be requested "on the grounds of discovery of
a fact susceptible of exerting a decisive influence which was
unknown to the Court and to the party requesting such re-
consideration prior to the rendering of the ruling.' ' 32 In addi-
tion, individuals and legal persons, as well as institutions of
the Communities may institute "third-party proceedings to
contest ruling which have been rendered without notification
to them. . .. -33 The Rules of Procedure of. the Court narrow
down the contest of a judgment by third parties, also called
third party opposition, to those who have been affected ad-
versely in their rights. Futhermore, contesting third parties
must give reasons as to why they were not able to participate
in the principal proceedings.3 4
Two judgments of the Court during its 1961-62 term dealt
with the interpretation of the provisions pertaining to third
party opposition35 The Court interpreted these, provisions
very narrowly and thus cut off the possibility of developing
these provisions into instruments for liberally filing appeals
against its judgments. In view of the far-ranging competence
of the Court this may be regrettable; on the other hand, a
wider interpretation of these provisions may greatly increase
30. Article 29, par. 2 of the Rules of Procedure.
31. Article 29, paragraphs 3-5, and article 30 of the Rules of Procedure.
32. Article 38 of the Statute of the Court. The request for reconside-ra-
tion must be brought within ten years of the judgment and within three
months of the discovery of the new fact.
33. Article 36 of the Statute of the Court.
34. Article 97, par. 1, of the Rules of Procedure.
35. Societe Breedband v. Societe des Acieries du Temple (formerly
S.N.U.P.A.T.) v. The High Authority, et. al., Dec. Nos. 42 and 29/59, July
12, 1962 (mimeo.) and The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v.
Societe Commerciale A. Vloebergh and the High Authority, Dec. Nos. 9 and
12/62, July 12, 1962 (mimeo.).
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the business before the Court without however creating a
true "two-tier" court structure.
III
Up to the conclusion of the 1961-62 term, which ended in
the middle of July of 1962, the Court of Justice had issued 87
opinions. Three opinions were of an advisory character and
involved the legality of certain proposed amendments of the
ECSC Treaty under article 95 of that Treaty; 36 one opinion
was the preliminary decision referred to previously; the others
were rendered in the exercise of the Court's contentious juris-
diction. All but six of the opinions grew out of the ECSC
Treaty; those remaining were the first litigations involving
provisions of the EEC Treaty. In all decisions pertaining to
contentious cases except three, the complainant was a govern-
ment of a Member State, a private enterprise or an associa-
tion of such enterprises, or an individual, while the defendant
party was a governmental organ of one of the European Com-
munities. The exceptions were two decisions in suits filed
by the EEC Commission against the government of a Mem-
ber State,,37 and a suit of an individual against the govern-
ment of a Member State concerning the scope of immunity
from local taxation enjoyed by the employees of the European
Communities.3 S It is interesting to note that individuals and
private enterprises freely instituted proceedings before the
Court against the decisions of the executive organs of the
Communities; on the other hand, actions instituted by Mem-
ber States and executive organs of the Communities remained
the exception. The main cause for this phenomenon lies in
the fortunate fact that conflicts arising between the interests
36. Advisory Opinions of December 12, 1959, 5 Rec. 551 (1959); of
March 4, 1960, 6/1 Rec. 93 (1960); and December 13, 1961, 7/V Rec. 505
(1961). The Court has been very cautious and circumspect in the discharge
of its responsibility to examine the "constitutionality" of amendments pro-
posed by the executive organs of the Coal and Steel Community. The first
two advisory opinions pertained to a proposed revision of article 56 of the
ECSC Treaty bestowing upon the High Authority increased powers for
making grants-in-aid in order to counter the effects of unemployment in
the coal industry. Only after the initial objections of the Court to the
proposed amendment were met in a revised proposal, did the Court ap-
prove the amendment. In the last Advisory Opinion, the Court did not
consider a proposed amendment to article 65 of the ECSC Treaty to be
compatible with the provisions of article 95. This amendment would have
given the High Authority additional powers for granting exemptions to
the anti-trust provisions of the Treaty contained in article 65.
37. See supra n. 13.
38. Hublet v. The Belgian State, Dec. No. 6/60, December 16, 1960, 6/I1
Rec. 1127 (1960).
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of one or more Member States are rather infrequent, whereas
the interests of different economic and social groups are more
likely to clash.
What are the most significant implications of the Court's
decisions and opinions? Of greatest significance appears to
be the development of a strong and uniform rule of law
among and within the six nation states that established the
three European Communities. Although this rule of law is
functionally limited to the economic sphere, its development
has had important political consequences. National govern-
ments bow to the judgments of the Court and adjust their
policies accordingly instead of basing the formulation of their
policies solely on what they conceive to be their "national
interests". This is demonstrated by the compliance of the
Italian government with the judgments of the Court, dis-
cussed earlier, in which the Court declared that the Italian
government had violated the EEC Treaty by imposing certain
import restrictions on pork products and by levying higher
customs duties on radio parts than allowed by the Treaty.39
Another example is the series of decisions of the Court with
respect to freight rates for coal within the territories of the
Member States.40 The decisions grew out of the very favor-
able special rates which the German railroads allowed for the
transport of coal to certain German blast furnaces that were
not advantageously located. The Lorraine steelworks, which
depend on Ruhr coal, benefitted from this practice when they
belonged to Germany but upon their return to France after
World War I, they had to pay the much higher normal trans-
port rates for Ruhr coal. Since the ECSC Treaty provides for
the abolition of all discrimination in transport rates within the
territory of the Communities and stipulates that special rates
were only to be allowed with the consent of the High Author-
ity, this institution decided to disallow part of the existing
German rates but to permit continuance of others for a
variety of reasons. Following this decision of the High
Authority the Court was swamped with appeals against it, -
appeals from the German government and German industries
that the decision was being too rigid, and appeals from the
39. See supra n. 19.
40. See Government of the Federal Republic of Germany v. The High
[Vol. 39
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French government and French industries that it was being
much too soft. The Court, however, basically upheld the
decision of the High Authority, although it did disallow two
more of the special rates following the French recommenda-
tions. Following the pronouncement of the Court's judg-
ments, the German government reconsidered its entire rate
structure and introduced a general low freight rate for coal
which was applicable to both internal and international
traffic.
A second important consequence of the Court's activities
has been the devlopment of a community-wide system of
public law which will inevitably have a strong impact on the
municipal law of the Member States. This is particularly
obvious in respect to the self-executing provisions which the
Treaties contain; to avoid proliferation of the interpretation
of these provisions, the Treaties, as has been shown, make the
Court of Justice the final arbiter for the determination of
the meaning of ambiguous rules. But beyond that there can
be little doubt that the case law built by the Court will induce
the Member States to harmonize pertinent segments of their
national laws, such as anti-trust statutes, either through mul-
tilateral conventions or parallel legislation. In this connec-
tion it should be also noted that article 3 h of the EEC
Treaty recommends to the Member States the approximation
of their respective municipal laws to the extent necessary for
the functioning of the Common Market.41 Thus a web of re-
lated laws is being spun which will enmesh the six Member
States in such a manner that in the future armed conflict
as a solution for the settlement of disputes will appear as an
absurdity and an impossibility.
Up to the present, the Court has guided the governments
of the Member States, the executive organs of the Communi-
ties, and the private enterprises, with a gentle and under-
standing, yet albeit firm hand, toward the attainment of the
Authority, Dec. No. 3/58, March 8, 1960, 6 Rec. 117 (1960) and Dec. No.
19/58, May 10, 1960, 6/I Rec. 469 (1960); Barbara Erzbergbau et al. v. The
High Authority, Dec. Nos. 3-18/58, 25 & 26/58, May 10, 1960, 6/I Rec. 367
(1960); and Chambre syndicale de la siderurgie de l'Est de la France
et ai. v. The High Authority, Dec. Nos. 26 & 36/58, May 10, 1960, 6/2 Rec.
573 (1960).
41. See also article 100-2 of the EEC Treaty which authorizes direct
Intervention by institutions of the EEC to reconcile the legislative and.
administrative rules of Member States under certain specified conditions.
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economic goals and the implicit political objectives of the
Treaties. Although primarily the guardian of legality in the
application of the Treaties, the Court has not refused to
exercise leadership when occasional timidity in the use of
power on the part of the High Authority has made it neces-
sary. As a consequence of this assumption of leadership
voices have been heard who talk of the prospect of a "govern-
ment by judges. '4 2  Although the judges of the Court of
Justice naturally deny any interest in or aspiration for such
a development,3 there is little doubt that, as Mr. Lagrange,
one of the advocates-general points out, the Court's role has
been "more important... and. . .considerably different from
that which had been visualized originally."'4 In this connec-
tion, it should be borne in mind that European jurists are
well aware of and often inspired by the judicial statesman-
ship of John Marshall.4 It is obvious, therefore, that the
Court will be an influential factor in the future development
of the internal and external relations of the European Com-
munities and that the judges will play a significant role in
giving direction to this development.
The role of the Court may become crucial in the future
when the Communities will be enlarged by the admission of
new members. The dynamic character of the European
Economic Community has attracted governments of states,
not only in Europe, but also in the Middle East. Greece has
concluded an agreement with the EEC providing for full
economic integration, but over a longer period than for the
present members. Currently applications for full member-
ship from Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland are
pending or are being negotiated. Israel has sounded out the
Communities with regard to membership but has been ad-
42. Lagrange, supra n. 12 at 417. See also the complaints expressed by
the "Committee of the Presidents" of the European Parliament in Parla-
ment Europeen, Documents de Seance, Rapport fait an nom du Oomite des
presidents, June 25, 1962, paragraphs 93 and 99.
43. During conversations with some of the judges of the Court which
the author had during a visit to Luxembourg in July of 1962, all insisted
that they had only one function, namely the application of the law as
found in the Treaties.
44. Lagrange, supra: n. 12 at 416.
45. It is noteworthy that the Court of Justice has evolved a limited
doctrine of "implied powers". See Federation Charbonniere de Belgique
v. The High Authority, Dec. No. 8/55, Nov. 29, 1956, 2 Rec. 267 (1955-56)
p. 304-5; also the critical comments of Maurice Lagrange, Les pouvolrs de
Ia Haute Autorite et I'appllcation du Traite de Paris, Revue du Droit
Publi et de a Science Politique, January-February 1961, p. 40-58, particu-
larly 46-48.
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vised that the present Member States are primarily concern-
ed with the development of an European organization. Spain
and Portugal have asked to join the Community as full mem-
bers, and a number of countries are seeking an associate mem-
bership. There appears to be little doubt that some of the ap-
plicants will be admitted, provided they accept the provisions
of the Treaties. This, in turn, will lead to an increased im-
portance of the Court and to an extension of the framework
of law which the Court has been constructing. Should, as
Assistant Secretary of State Schaetzel appeared to anticipate,
an Atlantic Community emerge in time from the growing
European Communities, the process of legal "harmonization"
may spread to an even larger area on both sides of the
Atlantic.
